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Comments

The Growth of Prison Privatization and the Threat
Posed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983

INTRODUCTION

The role of privatization in America is rapidly expanding.
Politicians, seeking to cut costs and reduce budget deficits, have
found that privatization is an effective tool to achieve their
objectives.' Privatization is the process of changing, as a business
or industry, from public to private control or ownership. 2 The
prison industry has been a recent target of privatization.3 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 ("section 1983") is a civil rights statute that is often a basis
for lawsuits filed by prisoners against prison guards. 4 Section 1983
seeks "to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority
5
to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights."
Governmental prison guards are afforded a qualified immunity from
suit. 6 In Richardson v. McKnight,7 521 U.S. 399 (1997), the Supreme
1. Phil Smith, Private Prisons: Profits of Crime, COVERT ACTION QUARTERLY, Fall 1993,
at 2 (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.mediafilter.org/MFF/Prison.html>.
2. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 936 (9th ed. 1991).
3. RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PuBuc AccouNTABILrY 4 (1997).
4. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
5. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
6. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
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Court held that the qualified immunity from suit should not be
extended to private prison guards.8
This comment explores the recent expansion of privatized
prisons, and the effect that section 1983 has and will have on this
expansion. Part I of this comment discusses the history and future
of prison privatization in the United States. Part II of this comment
discusses the impact of section 1983 on the future of prison
privatization. Part III discusses the impact that Richardson v.
McKnight has had on the prison privatization movement.8 9
I.

THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS IN
AMERICA

A.

Privatization Generally

The privatization movement in America has come full circle. In
recent years, federal, state, and local governments have been
contracting out traditionally governmental roles to America's
private sector in large numbers. 10 This movement has been
spawned by governmental budget cuts and politicians' beliefs that
the private sector is more adept at efficiently handling once distinct
public functions.'1 The growing interest in privatization can be12
traced to the 1980's and the election of President Ronald Reagan.
Reagan appealed to angry taxpayers, who saw the government
becoming increasingly involved in virtually every aspect of their
lives. Reagan's platform vowed to "get government off our backs."'13
During the Reagan administration, partisan politicians vigorously
advocated the "superiority of free enterprise." 14 Thus, the modem
privatization movement was born.
Privatization involves the removal of certain responsibilities,
activities, or assets from governmental control, usually in countries
retreating from post-war and post-colonial experiments with
socialism, and has included the separation of factories, mines,
7. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
8. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412.
9.
Id. at 399.
10. Paul Howard Morris, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the Privatization
Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 525 VAND. L. REV. 489, 491 (1999).
11. Id.
12. CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 3 (1990).
13. Id.
14. Smith, supra note 1, at 2.
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airlines, and railroads from public control.' 5 Such situations
typically involve governmental retention of collective financing, and
the delegation of delivery and management to the private sector.1 6
Although privatization in the United States may appear to be a
fairly recent phenomenon, the movement toward privatization can
7
be traced far back in our history.1
Privatizing traditional governmental functions can result in many
benefits for the American economy as a whole. The first obvious
benefit is that the private sector can typically perform the
governmental function more efficiently.1 8 A private sector firn can
spread overhead among its other private enterprises, thereby
reducing the unit cost of service for an individual enterprise. 19 The
private sector can perform the same function as the government
more efficiently because it operates under competition with a
motive for profits. 2° A profit-motivated manager will devote extra
time to operate the enterprise in the most efficient manner,
resulting in a reduction of operational costs. 2' A private sector firm
is well aware that a competitor will quickly take its place if it does
not utilize every resource to become efficient, without sacrificing
quality.2' The government lacks this incentive because it faces none
of the concerns of a private enterprise regarding profits or
competition. 3
By the 1980's, many Americans saw the wide range of potential
215 (1989).

15.

J. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS

16.

Id. In the case of prison privatization, collective financing is a process of financing

whereby the state continues to fund the costs of imprisonment, but the private sector is paid
to manage this imprisonment. HARDING, supra note 3, at 4. Some examples include the
private sector also supplying the prison building. Id. When the private enterprise manages
the prison at a cost lower than the state funds provided, the private enterprise realizes a
profit. Id.
17. Morris, supra note 10, at 490 (explaining that Christopher Columbus was a private
contractor for the Spanish Monarch). See also discussion infra Part II.
18. GARY W. BOwMAN, ET AL, PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM, POLICE,
ADJUDICATION, AND CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 290 (1992).
19. Id.
20. Morris, supra note 10, at 491.
21. BOwMAN, supra note 18, at 290.
22. Id.
23. MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS 14 (1993). Thomas
Jefferson once stated:
Having always observed that public works are always much less advantageously
managed than the same are by private hands, I have thought it better for the public to
go to the market for whatever it wants which is found there, for there competition
brings it down to the minimum value.
Id.

(citing LYNTON K CALDWELL, THE ADMINISTRATVE THEORIES OF HAMILTON AND JEFFERSON

(1944)).
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benefits that could result from the privatization of even the most
traditional governmental roles. President Reagan established the
President's Commission on Privatization to "identify those
government programs that are not properly the responsibility of the
federal government or that can be performed more efficiently by
the private sector."24 Among other things, the Commission
recommended privatization for low-income governmental housing,
air traffic control, education, the United States Postal Service,
prisons, and Medicare. 25 State governments have followed the
example set by the federal government; for instance, in 1991 the
State of Ohio retreated from the business of selling liquor to the
public by privatizing "state" liquor stores. 26 The sale of state
controlled liquor stores not only helped to decentralize state
government, but it also increased profitability without increasing
2
liquor consumption. 1
The 1980's also saw the United States exploring an unlikely
candidate to join the privatization movement - state and federal
prisons. The movement escalated as three trends converged: the
ideological imperatives of the free market, the dramatic increase in
the number of prisoners, and the increase in imprisonment costs.28
A collection of business entrepreneurs, free market advocates,
public officials facing budget deficits, and academics promised
design and management innovations without sacrificing prison
quality. 29 By the end of 1996, there were over 100 operational
30
private state and federal prisons in America.
B. History of Prison Privatization
Although the rapid movement toward the privatization of prisons
began in the 1980's, the notion of private finms operating prisons in
24.
MORE

Morris, supra note 10, at 492. See DAVID F. LINOWES ET AL, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD

EFFECTIVE

GOVERNMENT:

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION

ON PRIVATIZATION

xi

(1988).
25. Id. at 492-93.
26. Steve Stephens, Last Call for Ohio's Remaining Government-Run Liquor Stores,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, November 10, 1996, at IA.
27. James Bradshaw, Privatizing Liquor Sales a Win, Voinovich Says; Union
Disagrees, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 22, 1998, at 6B. Sales of liquor fell from 9.08 million
gallons in 1991, the year Ohio began privatizing liquor stores, to 8.11 million gallons for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1998. Id. For fiscal year 1998, profitability increased by $21.5
million over fiscal year 1997. Id.
28. Smith, supra note 1, at 2.
29. Id.
30. HARDING, supra note 3, at 4.
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America was not novel. State legislatures in the mid-1800's, intent
on cutting expenditures, awarded contracts to private
entrepreneurs to operate and manage Louisiana's first state prison,
as well as New York's Auburn and Sing Sing prisons.A' This early
privatization movement was limited, however, to the extent that the
states would lease convict labor to private companies, although in
32
some states fully operational private prisons were sanctioned.
Most of the prisoners in these early private prisons suffered from
malnourishment,
frequent whippings, overwork,
and
overcrowding.m As a result, state governments succumbed to public
pressure and began to regulate the private prisons. 4 By the early
1900's, opposition from labor, business, and reformers forced states
to take full responsibility for private prisons, effectively ending the
35
first era of private prisons.
Just as public pressure caused the demise of private prisons in
the early 1900's, public pressure brought a resurgence of the
concept in the 1980's. Frustrated taxpayers, angry at how large and
bureaucratic government had become, began to advocate that the
private sector could perform many governmental functions more
efficiently and at less cost than the government. One such function
was the operation of state and federal prisons. New companies
such as the Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA");
Wakenhut; Pricor; U.S. Corrections; Concepts, Inc.; and Correction
Management Affiliates were founded to capitalize on the growing
36
business opportunity of housing America's criminals.
CCA has emerged as the pioneer and industry leader in private
prisons, by capitalizing on the business and political expertise of its
co-founders, Doctor R. Crants and Tom Beasley.3 7 By 1992, CCA
31. Smith, supra note 1, at 2. These prisons were state operated, maximum security
facilities. Id.
32. Id. Texas is an example of one state that sanctioned fully operational private
prisons. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Opposition from labor, business, and reformers forced the state to shoulder the
burden of responsibility for prisons in America- Id.
35. Id.
36. Smith, supra note 1, at 2.
37. Id. at 4. Doctor R. Crants was a Nashville banker and financier, and Tom Beasley is
the former Tennessee Republican chair. Id. Both used their business and political ties to win
early governmental contracts. Id. Early contracts included Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") detention centers in Houston and Laredo, Texas, and the Silverdale
Workhouse in Tennessee. Id. Doctor Crants currently serves as chairman and chief executive
officer of CCA. Corrections Corporation of America, Company Officers (visited Feb. 14,
2000) <http://www.correctionscorp.cormfmnfo.htnl>.
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operated twenty-one detention facilities that held over 6,000
prisoners in six states, England, and Australia.3 As the crime rate
increased in the United States, so did the responsibility of housing
criminals. By the end of 1998, there were 1,302,019 prisoners under
federal and state jurisdictions with federal prisons operating at 27%
above capacity and state prisons between 13% and 22% above
capacity.39 The rate of increase for local, state, and federal
institutions is approximately 10% per year.40 CCA:s 1994 annual
report to shareholders stated that "[t]here are powerful market
forces driving our industry, and its potential has barely been
touched."41
C. Pros and Cons of Prison Privatization
The prison privatization movement has been accompanied by a
balance of eccentric supporters and harsh critics, each portraying
plausible arguments for their cause.
1. Pros of Prison Privatization
The two most common arguments for prison privatization is that
it will promote greater efficiency and improve quality in the
construction and management of prisons.42 Efficiency in the
construction of prison facilities encompasses both gains in the
speed with which facilities can be built or renovated, as well as
cost savings. 3 The private sector often has the resources to finance
major construction projects that local, state, and federal
governments are either unable or unwilling to finance due to
budget constraints." The concept of management efficiency
includes the idea that private entrepreneurs will strive to keep
costs down through the optimal utilization of staff, reduced capital
investments, and lowest-price purchasing of subsidiary prison
goods and services. 45 These are areas where public management
38. Smith, supra note 1, at 2.
39. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison
Statistics, (1999) (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm>.
40. BOWMAN, supra note 18, at 7.
41. HARDING, supra note 3, at 4.
42. BOWMAN, supra note 18, at 256.
43. Id. These are both critical advantages because the sooner the facilities are built
and become operational, the quicker the state will realize the cost savings that accompany
privatization. Id.
44. Id. The public sector is limited due to budget constraints, and any increased
financing would likely be passed on to unsympathetic taxpayers. Id.
45. Id. Private sector management would seek to operate efficiently using the least
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has traditionally been inefficient. 4 Improved construction quality
allows the private sector greater flexibility in choosing sites,
personnel, and material; it also allows the private sector to take
advantage of the latest building technology, resulting in an
improved capacity to respond to the specific needs of a very
47
diverse prison population.
2. Cons of Prison Privatization
Many opponents to the privatization movement concede that
privatization would result in greater efficiency; however, they
believe that overall prison quality would suffer due to the fact that
profit remains the ultimate goal in the private sector.48 Opponents
of prison privatization also argue that the process of incarcerating
criminals is an inherently governmental function that cannot be
ethically delegated to the private sector.49 The officially recorded
policy of the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") states:
The delegation of control and custody of prisoners to private
entities, in and of itself, raises serious constitutional concerns.
Because the deprivation of physical freedom is one of the
most severe interferences with liberty that the State can
impose, and because of civil liberties concern created by
private management ... the power to deprive another of his/
5°
her freedom cannot be delegated to private entities.
Many commentators also believe that privatization results in a
transfer of wealth from governmental employees who receive good
expensive means. Id. Public management has been largely ineffective in this area due to lack
of accountability. Id.
46. Id. This may result from the fact that, under affirmative-action policies, the
government must award a certain number of its contracts to local or minority-operated
companies. Id.
47. BOWMAN, supra note 18, at 256. A better facility design will result in improved
prisoner oversight and control capabilities. Id. This will result in manpower savings because
it will now be possible for one prison guard to perform the duties that previously required
several guards. Id.
48. Id. at 257. These opponents believe that even a minute decrease in quality, when
compared with the public prison system, would be unacceptable. Id.
49. Morris, supra note 10, at 495. Morris contends that opponents of privatization
assert that the government should not delegate the responsibility and power of regulating the
life of a citizen deprived of his freedom. Id.
50. LOGAN, supra note 12, at 49. The ACLU regards imprisonment as among the
"functions which rightfully belong to the government." Id. Sandy Rabinowitz, Director of the
Houston office of the ACLU has declared that "the whole concept [of private prisons] is
really frightening." Id.
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pay, benefits, job security, and good working conditions as a result
of working in government facilities, to a corporation, where profit
motives cause the bottom line to be critical, and subsequent
51
advantages to employees less plentiful.
There have also been security problems associated with private
prisons. One well reported example is the Northeast Ohio
Correctional Center, a CCA-operated prison that opened in
Youngstown in 1997.52 The prison initially opened as a
medium-security prison, but CCA soon began transferring maximum
security prisoners from prisons located in the Washington, D.C.
area to the Youngstown prison.5 During the first ten months the
prison was open, twenty prisoners were stabbed, two fatally, at the
hands of other prisoners.M Both state and city officials were aware
of the problems surrounding the Youngstown prison, yet they had
no way to monitor or control the problem because the Northeast
Ohio Correctional Center is a private enterprise, which enjoys all
the privacy rights that accompany private entities.5
On July 25, 1998, the situation became critical as six men, four of
them convicted killers, escaped from the Youngstown prison.5 All
six had been transferred from Washington, D.C. prisons. 57 The
escape occurred two days after CCA told a federal judge that it had
transferred all "dangerous" inmates from Youngstown to other
prisons. 58 CCA had requested that United States District Judge Sam
Bell lift a ban that prohibited the transfer of inmates to the
51. Morris, supra note 10, at 495. Critics assert that governmental functions are better
performed by governmental agencies that are not distracted by profit motivation. Id.
52. See CBS News: 60 Minutes, Private Prisons Break Rules to Make a Profit, (CBS
television broadcast, May 2, 1999); see also States Grapple with Private Prison Problems,
NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, April 15, 1999.
53. PrivatePrison Can't Be Closed, State Says, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, August 4, 1998.
Many of the inmates were transferred to Youngstown because of a lawsuit against a
Washington, D.C. area prison alleging the prison was a nuisance due to frequent escapes by
prisoners. Id.
54. States Grapple with Private PrisonProblems, NEW YORK TmIEs NEWS SERVICE, April
15, 1999.
55. Id. Government ;fficials are not involved in the daily operations of private prisons
to the same extent as they are for prisons run by the public. Id. Private prisons are not
subject to the same governmental oversight and monitoring. Id.
56. Randall Edwards, 4 Killers Escape, On Loose Private Prison, COLUMBus DISPATCI,
July 26, 1998, at Al. Some inmates may have caused a distraction that caused officers to
leave their assigned position in the recreation yard. Id.
57. Id. The six escapees included four prisoners convicted of murder, one convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon, and one serving time for armed robbery. Id.
58. Id.
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Youngstown prison.59 The escape prompted Ohio State Senator Bob
Hagan to say, "I don't think one escape proves that I was right, but
I think that two murders, close to twenty stabbings and now six
escapes provides a good indication that private prisons are not the
way to go in Ohio."6° Ohio's governor, George V. Voinovich, called
on United States Attorney General Janet Reno and other federal
officials to find a way to immediately close the Youngstown private
prison. 6' To support this request, Voinovich cited to the fact that
the United States Department of Justice has jurisdiction over the
District of Columbia prison system, where the Youngstown
escapees originated from. 62
Public officials were bewildered when they discovered that it
took the privately operated facility at least one-half hour to detect
the escape, and that prison officials only learned of the escape
because another prisoner had informed them.6 All six escapees
were eventually caught.6 A report on the Youngstown prison,
ordered by Attorney General Janet Reno, recommended that the
prisoner population be cut, recreational activities for prisoners be
increased, and more experienced supervisors be hired to oversee
prison operations.6 As is well justified, the Youngstown prison
debacle has given those opposed to prison privatization solid
ground to argue from.

59. Id. CCA told United States District Judge Bell that the corporation had transferred
the most dangerous inmates elsewhere and that it should be allowed to accept more
prisoners from the District of Columbia. Id.
60. Id. State Senator Bob Hagan is a Democrat from Youngstown. Id. Hagan lives in
near proximity to the prison and had vigorously opposed the prison. Id.
61. Catherine Candisky and Alan Johnson, Governor Asks Reno to Help Close Prison,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 30, 1998, at C1.
62. Id. Voinovich requested that Reno investigate the prison's contract and standards,
stating that he and residents near the prison were frightened and outraged. Id.
63. Rita Price, 2 Escapees Still Sought - Anger Erupts In Youngstown Over Private
Prison, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 27, 1998, at Al. Sergeant William Frease, of the Mahoning
County (Ohio) Sheriffs Office, said, "There were probably ninety guys who could have gone
out They just chose not to." Id.
64. Mark Tatge, Youngstown Prison Should be Cut in Size, Report Says, CLEVEIAND
PLAIN DEALER, December 5, 1998, at Al.
65. Id. The report was prepared by Corrections Trustee John L. Clark at the request of
Attorney General Janet Reno. Id.
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ON THE FUTURE OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION

Why Prison Guards are Susceptible to Liability Under Section
1983

A prison guard is a private party performing a traditional
government function. However, this private party is subject to
many of the same legal standards as their government
counterparts. 66 Under section 1983, anytime a private party
performs a state governmental function, constitutional implications
could result. 67 Section 1983 is a civil rights statute that protects the
rights of everyone - including those of prisoners. 68 Section 1983
creates a cause of action when any person, acting under the
authority of state law, deprives another person of a right
guaranteed by either a federal statute or the Constitution. 69 It seeks
to "deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights."7 0 It imposes
liability only where a person acts "under color" of a state "statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage."" Courts have interpreted
section 1983 to impose liability upon a private individual when
72
their actions are "fairly attributable to the state."
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ) (1994). A private prison guard is subject to section 1983
because the civil rights statute applies when a private party performs a government function.
Id.
67. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
68. Id. Section 1983 protects "any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction." Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
70. Richardson. v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403 (1997) (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158
(1992)).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). A private party acts "under color of state law" within the
meaning of section 1983 if the party's actions are "fairly attributable to the State." See Wyatt
v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). This
requirement is satisfied if two conditions are met. First, the "deprivation must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible." Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 162.
Second, the private party must have "acted together with or... obtained significant aid from
state officials" or engaged in conduct "otherwise chargeable to the State." Wyatt, 504 U.S. at
162.
72. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 162; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924.
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,Section 1983 was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, as an attempt to curb violence perpetrated by the Ku
Klux Klan against African-Americans in southern states.7 3 Southern
state courts and governments had historically not protected
African-Americans from the violence of the Klan, and section 1983
was enacted as a measure that would enable the federal judiciary
to respond to these violations of individual liberty.7 4 However,
section 1983 originally had little impact on the southern states'
practice of not affording protection to African-Americans. 75 For the
first ninety years after its passage, the Supreme Court interpreted
the section narrowly, and consistently held that section 1983 only
applied to actions committed by state officials pursuant to official
state policy.76 Therefore, if a person employed by the state was not
acting in an "official" capacity, pursuant to "official state policy," a
77
citizen was unable to utilize section 1983 to achieve redress.
In the Civil Rights Cases,78 the Court held that section 1983 was
not a remedy for the wrongful acts of individuals who acted
contrary to state policy.79 The Civil Rights Cases were an
amalgamation of cases brought by the United States against
73. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The Court found that the passage of
the Act was a direct result of "the campaign of violence and deception in the South,
fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens their civil and political
rights." Id. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961) (discussing the passage of the
Act which became the Ku Klux Klan Act: "This section of the bill, on the same state of facts,
not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been that of
slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be
deprived of rights.")
74. Morris, supra note 10, at 498; Gene R. Nichol, Federalism, State Courts and §
1983, 73 VA L REV. 959, 974-75 (1987).
75. Morris, supra note 10, at 498. For the first fifty years after its passage, only
twenty-one cases were decided under the statute. Id.
76. Id. There was a long-standing assumption that section 1983 reached only
misconduct either officially authorized or so widely tolerated as to amount to custom or
usage. See PETER W. Low AND JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 970 (3d ed. 1994).

77. Morris, supra note 10, at 498. This narrow interpretation of section 1983 was
because the purpose of the legislation was to protect citizens from state indifference to Ku
Klux Klan violence. Id.
78. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
79. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17. Justice Bradley explained,
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority is simply a
private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured
party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if
not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under state authority, his rights
remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the
state for redress.
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individuals, for alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 187 5 .80
The allegations against the individuals included denying to persons
of color the accommodations and privileges of an inn or hotel;
denying to individuals of color the privileges and accommodations
of a theater; and the refusal of a conductor of a railroad company
to allow a woman of color to ride in the "ladies" car.81 The Court
stated that unless a state policy expressly sanctioned the
individual's wrongful conduct, the plaintiff's redress was limited to
an action against the individual through state law.82 Thus, it
appeared that section 1983 applied only to state policies and not to
actions performed by state officials.
Until the 1960's, the United States Supreme Court held steadfast
to this narrow interpretation of section 1983. However, in 1961 the
Court decided Monroe v. Pape,s3 which greatly expanded the
Court's interpretation of section 1983.14 In Monroe, the Court held
that, even though the Illinois Constitution and other state laws
outlawed unreasonable searches and seizures, a suit brought by
Illinois residents against police who allegedly made illegal searches
and seizures could be maintained under section 1983, before any
relief was afforded under a state statute.8 5 Prior to this ruling, an
80. Id. at 4. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was entitled "An Act to Protect all Citizens in
Their Civil and Legal Rights." Id.
81. The Civil Rights Cases, 190 U.S. at 4-5. The individuals were alleged to have denied
a "colored person" a seat in the dress circle of Maguire's theater in San Francisco; denying
another person, whose "color" is not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of
the theater known as the Grand Opera House in New York; and the refusal of a conductor of
the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company to allow a woman of African descent to ride in
the "ladies" car. Id.
82. Id. at 17.
83. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
84. Morris, supra note 10, at 498. In Monroe, it was alleged that 13 Chicago police
officers broke into the home of the petitioners, routed them from bed, and made them stand
naked in the living room while the officers ransacked the home. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 169 (1961). Monroe was then taken to the police station, interrogated for 10 hours about
a two-day old murder, was not taken before a magistrate, was not permitted to place a
phone call, and was subsequently released with no criminal charges being filed. Id. The
complaint alleged that the police had no search warrant and that they acted "under color of
the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages" of Illinois and the City of Chicago.
Id.
85. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. The Court noted that the federal remedy was
supplementary to the state remedy and that the state remedy did not need to be sought and
refused before the federal remedy could be invoked. Id. The Court looked to United States
v. Classic to determine when a state official is acting "under the color of state law." Id.
(citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941)). The Classic Court held that
"[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of state
law." Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
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individual could not successfully litigate a section 1983 claim unless
the state law or policy at issue explicitly condoned the state
official's behavior. Monroe allowed individuals to base their section
1983 claims on the fact that a state official's conduct violated their
civil rights, and did not have to prove that a state law or policy
violated their civil rights.8 6 The Monroe decision cleared the way
for the use of section 1983 as a multi-purpose cause of action
against state officials who violate a federally created right, even if
in doing so the state official is acting against state policy.87 Thus,
the Monroe Court determined that section 1983 applied to state
officials acting under the color of state law, even though they were
acting contrary to state law and policy.88
It was not until 1970, however, that the Supreme Court ruled that
a section 1983 action could be maintained against a private party
who was not connected in any way to a state government. In
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 89 the Court held that a private party
defendant's actions warranted treatment as governmental actions
subject to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. 90 Adickes involved an action by a white, female
plaintiff who had been denied service in the defendant's restaurant
because she was in the company of African-Americans. 91 The
plaintiff brought a section 1983 claim against the restaurant owner
to recover damages for an alleged violation of her constitutional
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 2 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to
serve her because of a state-enforced custom of segregating the
races in public restaurants.9 3 The Adickes Court, in reversing the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held that a
86. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
87. Morris, supra note 10, at 499. Prior to Monroe, section 1983 was interpreted
narrowly and only provided relief if state officers' actions were sanctioned by the state. Id.
The statute is now a multi-purpose statute because it now protects against violations of
federal law by state officials even when acting contrary to state law. Id.
88. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-84.
89. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
90. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 169-71. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "No State . . . shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S CONST. amend. XIV.
91. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146.
92. Id. The alleged violation occurred at a restaurant in Mississippi. Id. However, the
action was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which provides
that "No State... shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S CONST. amend. XIV.
93. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 147.
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section 1983 claim can be brought against a private party if a
plaintiff can show: (1) the existence of a state-enforced custom of
segregating the races in public eating places; and (2) that the
defendant's refusal to serve the plaintiff was motivated by that
state-enforced custom.94 The Court explained that in order to meet
the first nexus of the test in Adickes, a jury would have to find that
a police officer was present in the restaurant while the plaintiff
was refused service, and that the police officer communicated his
95
disapproval of service to the restaurant employees.
Adickes required a degree of conspiratorial intent between the
private party and a government official before a section 1983 claim
could be successfully litigated. 96 In Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co. 9
the Supreme Court ruled that lack of conspiratorial intent is not
necessarily a bar to a section 1983 claim.98 Edmundson brought suit
in Virginia state court for a debt owed by Lugar.9 The clerk of the
state court issued a writ of attachment that was executed by the
county sheriff. 1 0 Lugar then brought a section 1983 action, claiming
94. Id. at 173-74. The Court noted in a footnote that
[a]ny notion that a private person is necessarily immune from liability under section
1983 because of the "under color of' requirement of the statute was put to test by our
holding in United States v. Price, [383 U.S. 787 (1966)]. There, in the context of a
conspiracy, the Court said: "To act 'under color' of law does not require that/the
accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint
activity with the State."
Id. at 174 n. 44.
95. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158. Thus, the presence of a police officer communicating
disapproval would amount to a state-enforced custom of segregation in eating
establishments. Id. In Adickes, the defendant failed to demonstrate that no police officer was
present in the store when the alleged discrimination took place. Id. The jury could infer
from the circumstances that the police officer and a restaurant employee had a "meeting of
the minds" and determined that the plaintiff should not be served. Id. A private party
involved in such a conspiracy can be liable under section 1983. Id. at 152.
Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting
'under color' of law for the purposes of the statute. To act 'under color' of law does
not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
96. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
97. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
98. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42. The Lugar Court expanded the holding in Adickes by

no longer requiring a conspiratorial intent between the accused and the state. Id. Lugar
explained that the accused can be liable if their actions can be fairly attributable to the state
and that invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of a state created attachment
procedure was fairly attributable to the, state. Id.
99. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924. Edmundson was a supplier of Lugar's, and the debt was
owed on these supplies. Id.
100. Id. The trial judge later dismissed the attachment, citing Edmundson's failure to
establish the alleged statutory grounds for attachment. Id. at 925.
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that through the attachment of his property, Edmundson had acted
jointly with the State of Virginia to deprive him of his property
without due process of law.' 01 The Lugar Court held that if the
conduct by Edmundson amounted to state action for purposes of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the
conduct was also action under color of state law, and would
support a suit under section 1983.12 In an opinion by Justice Byron
White, the Court rationalized as follows:
[I]f a debtor in state-court debt collection proceedings can
successfully challenge, on federal due process grounds, the
plaintiff creditor's resort to the procedures authorized by a
state statute, it is difficult to understand why that same
behavior by the state court plaintiff should not provide a
cause of action under section 1983.103
This effectively put an end to the requirement that a private
individual must first conspire with a government official
before a section 1983 claim can successfully be maintained.
After Lugar, if an individual's due process is violated in
accordance with state statutory procedures, that individual
will be allowed a federal cause of action under section 1983.104
B.

Defenses Available to a Section 1983 Suit

Once a section 1983 claim has been brought, a defendant may be
able to successfully assert qualified immunity as to the statute.
Section 1983 does not explicitly mention the defense of qualified
immunity in the text of the statute.10 5 The immunity has been
101. Id. at 925. Lugar brought the action against both Edmundson Oil Company and its
president, Ronald L. Barbour. Id.
102. Id. at 935. Lugar sought compensatory and punitive damages for specified
financial loss allegedly caused by the attachment. Id. at 925.
103. Id. at 934. The Court looked to its other decisions involving garnishment
procedures and due process for support in its holding. See Snidach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); and
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Id. at 937.
104. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 934. The Court reiterated that the Act was passed for the
purpose of enforcing the rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
105. Section 1983 provides in full as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in a any action brought
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afforded by the courts through common law and has been
gradually expanded over time.
The first case in which the Supreme Court recognized and
extended qualified immunity to a government official was Pierson
v. Ray.106 In Pierson, fifteen white and African American Episcopal
clergymen, who attempted to use segregated facilities at an
interstate bus terminal, were arrested by Jackson, Mississippi
police officers and charged with violating a Mississippi statute. 107
The Mississippi statute made it illegal for anyone to congregate
with others in a public place under such circumstances that a
breach of the peace may occur. 0 8 The clergymen brought a section
1983 action against the police officers for making an
unconstitutional and false arrest.' °9 The Supreme Court held that
the defenses of good faith and probable cause were available to the
officers in a section 1983 action. 11° The Court reasoned that section
1983 liability "should be read I against the background of tort
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
106. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
107. Pierson, 386 U.S: at 549. The clergymen were charged with violating section
2087.5 of the Mississippi Code, which provided in part:
(1) Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby: (a) Crowds or
congregates with others in . . . any hotel, motel, store, restaurant, lunch counter,
cafeteria, sandwich shop, . . . or any other place of business engaged in selling or
serving members of the public, or in or around any free entrance to any such place of
business or public building, or to any building owned by another individual . . . and
who fails or refuses to disperse or move on, when ordered to do so by any law
enforcement officer of the State of Mississippi, or any other authorized person,
shall be guilty of disorderly conduct ....
MISS. CODE § 2087.5 (1942) (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-3 (1999)).
108. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549. The petitioners waived a jury trial and were convicted of
the offense by a municipal police justice. Id. at 550. One petitioner appealed to the county
court and the court granted his motion for a directed verdict. Id. The cases against the other
petitioners were dropped. Id.
109. Id. at 550. The suit was brought for damages in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi. Id.
110. Id. at 557. The police officers did not attempt to defend on the theory that they
believed in good faith that it was constitutional to arrest the ministers solely for using the
waiting room. Id. The officers claimed that they did not arrest the ministers for the purpose
of preserving the custom of segregation in Mississippi, but solely for the purpose of
preventing violence. Id. The Court also noted that the defense of good faith and probable
cause was available to police officers under the common law action for false arrest and
imprisonment. Id.
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liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions," and part of this background includes the defenses
of good faith and probable cause for police officers making an
arrest."' Under Pierson, the officers could escape liability under
section 1983 if they could prove that they reasonably believed in
good faith that the arrests were constitutional, even though the
arrests were in fact unconstitutional."'
The Supreme Court has since clarified the qualified immunity
defense through its decision in Wood v. Strickland."3 In Wood, the
Court explained that a defendant charged with a section 1983 claim
would escape liability through a qualified immunity defense only if
he could show that he subjectively believed he was acting
4
constitutionally, and that this belief was objectively reasonable.1
Three years later in Procunierv. Navarette,1 5 the Supreme Court
held for the first time that a public prison guard was entitled to the
qualified immunity defense.1 6 In Procunier, a state prisoner
brought a section 1983 action against prison officials alleging a
negligent interference with the prisoner's outgoing mail in violation
of his constitutional rights." 7 The Supreme Court, following the
precedent set in Wood, held that the prison officials were entitled
to qualified immunnity when faced with section 1983 liability.118 The
Court went on to say that the only way the prison officials would
be found liable under the Wood test would be if there was a clearly
established constitutional right, the prison officials knew or should
have known of the constitutional right, and the prison officials
knew or should have known that their actions violated that right." 9
111. Id. at 556.
112. Id.
113. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Wood involved a suit by Arkansas public high school students
who were expelled from school for violating a school regulation prohibiting the use or
possession of intoxicating beverages at school or school activities. Id. at 308. The students
claimed that their federal constitutional rights to due process were infringed under color of
state law by their expulsion from school. Id. at 308.
114. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22. The Court held that a school board member is not
immune from liability for damages under section 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected.
Id. at 322.
115. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
116. Procunier,434 U.S. at 561. The Court noted that the prison officials and officers
were not absolutely immune from liability. Id.
117. Id. at 557. The prisoner claimed a violation of his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id.
118. Id. at 561.
119. Id. at 562. The Court explained that at the time of the alleged infringement, there
was no clearly established First Amendment right of protecting the mailing privileges of state
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1 20 the Supreme Court strengthened
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
the
1
2
1
qualified immunity defense.
Harlow eliminated the subjective
aspect of the Wood test by holding that a defendant could avoid
liability if his actions did not violate a clearly established
constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known to
be a clearly established constitutional right. 12 2 Thus, because of the
Harlow decision, it is much easier for a governmental defendant to
assert a qualified immunity defense and have it be successfully
applied.
The qualified immunity that the Supreme Court has extended to
governmental officials has not been granted to private individuals.
In Wyatt v. Cole,123 a case factually similar to Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., the Court held that private defendants charged with
section 1983 liability for invoking state replevin, garnishment, and
attachment statutes, which were later declared unconstitutional,
were not entitled to qualified immunity.1 24 Wyatt and Cole were
involved in a cattle partnership that Cole sought to dissolve.12 5 After
Cole and Wyatt were unable to reach an agreement concerning
dissolution, Cole and his attorney filed a complaint in replevin, as
126
was authorized by Mississippi law.
Wyatt brought a section 1983 action, and a United States district

prisoners. Id. at 562-63.
120. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
121. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800. Harlow did not involve a section 1983 claim. Id. In
Harlow, the plaintiff brought suit for damages based on his allegedly unlawful discharge
from employment in the Air Force. Id. The defendants were senior White House aides to
former President Richard M. Nixon and claimed immunity from suit because the case
involved actions that they carried out as part of their official duties. Id. at 806.
122. Id. at 818. The Harlow Court held that government officials performing
discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages as long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a
reasonable person would have known about. Id.
123. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
124. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168-69. The Court stressed that qualified immunity acts to
safeguard government, not to benefit its agents. Id. at 168. The Court recognized that private
citizens may unsuspectingly rely on state laws they did not create and may have no reason
to believe are invalid, but that this reason alone cannot support an expansion of qualified
immunity. Id.
125. Id. at 159.
126. Id. at 160. Mississippi law provided that an individual could obtain a court order
for seizure of property possessed by another by posting a bond and swearing to a state court
that the applicant was entitled to that property and that the adverse possessor "wrongfully
took and detained or wrongfully detained" the property. 1975 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 508 §1,
(current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-37-101 (1999)). A complaint in replevin is "an action
whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover
those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken or who wrongfully
detains such goods or chattels." BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990).
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court declared the Mississippi statute unconstitutional, holding that
the statute failed to afford judges the discretion to deny writs of
replevin, thereby violating Wyatt's due process rights. 127 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Cole and
his attorney, as private individuals, were entitled to qualified
immunity so as to escape liability under section 1983.128 The Wyatt
Court stressed that it had "recognized qualified immunity for
government officials where it was necessary to preserve their
ability to serve the public good or to ensure that talented
candidates were not deterred by the threat of damages suits from
entering public service." 129 The Court also noted that qualified
immunity strikes a balance between compensating those who have
been injured by official conduct, and protecting governments'
ability to perform its traditional functions. 30 The Court could not
justify an expansion of the qualified immunity rationale so as to
allow its application to private parties. 131 The Court held that the
"nexus between private parties and the historic purposes of
qualified immunity is simply too attenuated to justify such an
132
extension of our doctrine of [qualified] immunity."
The Wyatt Court left open the possibility of a "good faith"
defense, stating that it "did not foreclose the possibility that private
defendants faced with § 1983 liability . . . could be entitled to an
affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or
that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties
could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens."' 1
This possible "good faith" defense may one day be used to defeat
many of the section 1983 actions filed against private prison
guards; however, to date the Supreme Court has not recognized a
"good faith" defense for such private prison guards.
127.

Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Miss. 1989).

128.

Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161.

129.

Id. at 167 (citing Wood, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975)).

130. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554 (1967); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
131. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168. The Court provided that qualified immunity acts to
"safeguard government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its agents."
Id.
132. Id. at 168. The Court stressed that private parties hold no office requiring them to
exercise discretion. Id.
133. Id. at 169. These issues were not addressed because they were not fairly before
the Court. Id.
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RICHARDSON V. MCKNIGHT

Until 1997, there was much debate as to whether qualified
immunity would apply in the context of private prisons, because a
private prison guard serves almost exactly the same function as a
governmental prison guard.3 4 The Supreme Court resolved this
debate in Richardson v. McKnight, holding that prison guards
employed by a private firm are not entitled to qualified immunity
from section 1983 suits brought by prisoners.' 35 McKnight, a
prisoner at a privatized Tennessee correctional center, filed an
action under section 1983 for physical injuries allegedly inflicted by
the prison guards. 136 The Court looked at four aspects of Wyatt v.
Cole, which controlled their decision to deny immunity to the
prison guards. 3 7 First, a section 1983 action can sometimes impose
liability on private individuals. 13 Second, a distinction exists
between an immunity from suit and other legal defenses.'39 Third,
one must look to the history and purpose of section 1983 immunity
to determine whether private individuals enjoy protection from
liability.' 40 Fourth, Wyatt is applicable to the narrow facts upon
which it was decided, and should not be applied to all cases that
4
concern private individuals.' '
134. Id. at 168-69. The Wyatt holding of not extending qualified immunity to private
parties was limited to the situation in which a private defendant was faced with section 1983
liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute. Id. See Morris,
supra note 10, at 518, and Peter J. Duitsman, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private
Sector Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L REV. 2209, 2254 (1998), both arguing that
private prison guards are entitled to a qualified immunity or good-faith defense. Id.
135. 521 U.S. 399 (1997). The private prison guards argued that they performed the
same duties as state prison guards and therefore, should be offered the same immunity as
their government counterparts. Id. at 408. The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee denied the prison guards' motion to dismiss, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 402.
136. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401. The two prison guards sued were Daryll Richardson
and John Walker. Id. They asserted a qualified immunity from section 1983 lawsuits. Id. at
401-02.
137. Id. at 402 (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992)).
138. Id. at 403. The Wyatt Court noted that section 1983 seeks to "deter state actors
from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed
rights" and to provide related relief, but that section 1983 can sometimes impose liability on
a private individual. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161-62.
139. Id. The Court distinguished an immunity from suit, which frees a defendant from
liability whether or not he acted wrongly, from other legal defenses, which involve looking
to the essence of the wrong. Id. This distinction is important because an immunity frees one
from liability even if they acted wrongly. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 171-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 403-04. The Court has afforded immunity where it has
found there was a "tradition of immunity firmly rooted in the common law." Id. at 403.
141. Id. at 404. The Court noted that Wyatt did not provide an answer to the legal
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The Richardson Court, in reviewing the justification for a
qualified immunity defense, stressed that history does not reveal a
"firmly rooted tradition" of immunity applicable to private prison
guards. 42 The prison guards argued that, because they perform the
same duties as governmental prison guards, they should be
afforded the same immunity.143 The Court determined that to decide
the issue on a "functional approach" would be to misinterpret the
meaning of section 1983.144 The majority opinion, written by Justice
Stephen Breyer, looked to the fact that the most important factor
in extending qualified immunity to governmental prison guards unwarranted timidity - is not present in the private prison setting.145
Competitive market pressures, the Court insisted, insure effective
job performance because those guards who are too timid or
aggressive will be replaced, due to the rising costs faced by their
employers as a result of lawsuits.' 46 Private prisons that do not
perform an effective job will be replaced by competitors who not
only effectively perform their duties, but also perform them at a
lower cost.
The Richardson Court reasoned that "marketplace pressures
provide the private firm with strong incentives to avoid overly
question of whether private prison guards enjoy a qualified immunity from suit under section
1983, but Wyatt did direct the Court to look to both the history and purposes that underlie
government employee immunity. Id. The Wyatt Court decided against extending qualified

immunity to private individuals; however, the Richardson Court acknowledged that Wyatt
does not control every factual scenario when qualified immunity is in question. Id.
142. Id. at 407-08. These justifications include the "'necessity to preserve' the ability of
government officials 'to serve the public good or to ensure that talented candidates were not
deterred by the threat of damages suits from entering public service'" and "principled and
fearless decision-making." Id. at 408. The Court noted that in the 19th century, private
enterprises handled some of the prison management activities and that there is no evidence
of extending an'immunity toward defendants who performed these functions. Id. at 404.
143. Id. at 408.
144. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408. Using the "functional approach" would force the
Court to afford qualified immunity to the private prison guards because they perform the
same functional duties as their public prison guard counterparts to whom qualified immunity
is extended. Id. at 409. The Court noted that, in many areas, private industry performs the
same funpctions as government. Id. The Court provided examples including electricity
production, waste disposal and mail delivery. Id.
145. Id. at 409. The Court looked to earlier precedent, which described the immunity
as protecting against unwarranted timidity by public officials as "encouraging the vigorous
exercise of official authority," Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978); by contributing to
.principled and fearless decision making," Wood, 420 U.S. at 319 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at
554); and by responding to the concern that a threat of liability would "'dampen the ardour
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible' public officials," Harow, 457 U.S. at
814. Id. at 408.
146. Id. at 409. The Court noted that these market pressures were present in this case.
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timid, insufficiently vigorous, unduly fearful, or non-arduous
employee job performance." 147 These competitive market pressures
are not present in the public prison setting. 14 Governmental
employees are responsible to elected officials and the voting public
as a whole. 4 9 The prison guard's individual performance is rarely
considered, and civil service rules limit the ability of governmental
prison guards to be rewarded or punished. 150
Additionally, private prisons often obtain insurance to protect
potential employees from damages suits, effectively eliminating
situations where qualified guard applicants would be discouraged
from applying due to fear of potential lawsuits. 151 Governmental
prison guard "insurance" comes in the form of a qualified immunity
from liability under section 1983.152 The Court also noted that
privatization excuses private prisons from adhering to many civil
service law restraints such as a uniform, graduated pay scale for
different levels of employee experience. 5 3 A private firm, unlike a
public prison, has the ability to offset any increased risks with
higher pay or benefits. 15
The.Richardson Court also dismissed the argument that qualified
immunity should be afforded to private prison guards because
lawsuits against them would distract employees from their duties.'5 0
The Court, looking to precedent in qualified immunity cases,
insisted that distraction alone cannot supply sufficient grounds for
immunity. 56 Thus, the Court concluded that there are no special
147. Id. at 410.
148. Id. The Court noted that the private prison guards in question worked for a large,
multi-state private prison firm, that the firm was organized to operate at a profit, and that at
the end of its three year contract, the state reviews the firm's performance and the state can
choose to award the contract to a competing firm. Id. at 409-10.
149. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 410.
150. Id. at 410-11. The Court explains that this is the reason why they find no special
immunity-related need to encourage vigorous performance by private prison guards. Id.
151. Id. at 411. The Court explained that private prisons are required to maintain
comprehensive insurance coverage. Id.
152. Id. State prisons will still attract talented guards because the guards will know
they have immunity from suit, and the fear of potential lawsuits will not weigh in their
decision to accept or reject employment. Id.
153. Id. In Tennessee, civil service laws do not apply to employees of a private prison
contractor. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-111 (1997).
154. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 411. The Court found it difficult to find a special need for
the immunity because the guards' employer does not need to operate like a typical
government department. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. The Court noted it was significant that Tennessee
law reserved some decisions within the private prison scope for state officials. Richardson,
521 U.S. at 412. These decisions included those involving prison discipline and parole. Id.
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reasons that would favor an extension of the immunity doctrine to
1 57
the private prison setting.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in Richardson,
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy
and Thomas.15 1 Justice Scalia argued that the majority opinion was
unsupported by the common law or public policy and that the
majority failed to use the Court's settled practice of determining
section 1983 liability using a functional approach. 159 Using a
functional approach would force the Court to recognize the
qualified immunity defense to section 1983 liability because private
prison guards perform the same function as their governmental
counterparts. 160 Justice Scalia noted that private individuals have
regularly been granted immunity when they perform a
governmental function. 61 The dissenters then dispelled the
majority's view that there are policy reasons to deny qualified
immunity to private prison guards because they believe that history
governs the matter.'62 Justice Scalia concluded by questioning the
majority's ability to distinguish between the private and public
prison guard and by noting that the effect of the majority's decision
will be to "artificially raise the cost of privatizing prisons."'13
157.

Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412.
158. Id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The functional approach examines the "nature of
the functions with which a particular class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and...
the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate
exercise of those functions." Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).
160. Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia pointed out that the parties
conceded that the private prison guards on trial performed a "prototypical" governmental
function because their duties were to enforce the "state imposed deprivation of liberty." Id.
161. Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia provided an example of a grand
juror who is accorded absolute immunity from suit much in the same way that prosecutors
and judges are awarded immunity, noting that like prosecutors and judges they must
"exercise a discretionary judgement on the basis of evidence presented to them." Id. (citing
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). Justice Scalia also points out that witnesses who
testify in court proceedings are granted immunity. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 417-18 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
162. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 418 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia responded to the
majority's opinion that unwarranted timidity is less likely a concern with a private prison
guard because of competitive market pressures by explaining that there are not competitive
market pressures when politicians award the private prison contracts; thus making it a
governmental decision and not a market choice. Id. at 419.
163. Id. at 422 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). The rise in prison costs will either make the
privatization of prisons too expensive or cause the state to divert funds to support the
increased costs. Id. at 422.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:591

CONCLUSION

The decision in Richardson has, at least temporarily, resolved
the issue of qualified immunity and its application to private prison
guards. However, with the increasing popularity of private prisons,
related issues are sure to be addressed in the future. As the
Richardson Court noted, its decision involved only the issue of
immunity under section 1983, not liability.'1' With the number of
prisoners increasing in the United States, the overall costs
associated with maintaining prisons has skyrocketed.6 5 Both state
and federal budgets have had to account for this increase. 166 These
huge costs have consequently increased the popularity of private
prisons.167 With the number of private prisons increasing, the
number of section 1983 claims against private prison guards will
also increase. In the near future, the Court may be forced to
address factual situations different than the one faced in
Richardson; for example, a prison that is operated under a mixture
of private and public control. Future opinions will need to decide
whether a "good faith" defense will be afforded to private prison
guards who are denied the defense of qualified immunity. The
Wyatt Court left open the possibility of a "good faith" defense,
stating that it "did not foreclose the possibility that private
defendants faced with § 1983 liability . . .could be entitled to an
affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or
that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties
could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens."lss Neither the
Richardson nor Wyatt opinions discussed what a good faith
defense would entail, but Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Wyatt does offer some guidance. 169 Justice Anthony
Kennedy suggested that a good faith defense will be valid if the
164.

Id. at 413. The Court also noted that the result may have been different if it were

dealing with facts in which a private individual was briefly associated with a governmental
body and serving as an adjunct to government in an essential government activity, or acting
under close official supervision. Id. Thus, the five to four decision in Richardson was
narrow in scope. Id. at 413-14.
165. Smith, supra note 1, at 2. Smith stresses that in 1990, 421 Americans out of
100,000 were in prisons and jails and that by 1992, the number had risen to 455. Id.
166. Id. at 3. For instance, in California, the state budget for corrections increased
seven-fold in the 1980's to $2.1 billion dollars a year. Id. Even with the increase, the
California prison system was still operating at eighty percent over its capacity. Id.
167. Id.
168. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169. These issues were not addressed in Wyatt because they
were not fairly before the Court. Id.
169. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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defendant can show that he subjectively believed his acts to be
constitutional and that his belief is objectively reasonable. 170
Private prisons are a product of the downsizing efforts by
government, an effort that will likely continue into the twenty-first
century. Governments praise private prisons for their cost saving
operations, and realize that they are needed to house the escalating
prison population. The Richardson Court's reliance on competitive
market forces as a justification for not expanding a qualified
immunity to private prison guards is not persuasive. Competition
may, in the short run, serve to alleviate a private prison guard's
timidity or aggressiveness, but the long-term effect of not offering
immunity to private prison guards will be extinction of the private
prison system. Private firms will no longer be willing to run the
liability risk that is guaranteed to accompany the operation of a
prison. Insurance will only go so far. Premiums will become too
costly to justify operating a private prison.
The Richardson decision may all but effectively end the system
that has saved billions of dollars for the state and federal
governments. One answer may be the implementation of a
quasi-private prison. A quasi-private prison would be a prison that
combines aspects from both a government-run prison system and a
privately operated prison system.
Although this type of prison will not likely offer the amount of
savings associated with a truly private prison, it will be able to
implement certain private, cost-saving techniques, while still being
able to afford its prison guards with a qualified immunity
protection from lawsuits. After Richardson, the only way a
quasi-private prison will be able to achieve this result is to employ
federal prison guards. These quasi-private prison guards would be
subject to the same salary levels that federal prison guards are
afforded.
This proposal would place the quasi-prison guards within the
civil service rules system that the Richardson Court cited as one of
the reasons that governmental prison guards are afforded a
qualified immunity. 171 The Court stated that because governmental
prison guards operate in a system composed of civil service rules
that have an effect on the way they perform their duties, then they
should be afforded a qualified immunity to ensure that the
170. Id. at 175 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy suggested that it should be open to
the defendant to show good faith even if a reasonable person in the defendants' position
would have acted in a different way. Id.
171. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 410-11.
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governmental prison guard performs his duties effectively without
being overly concerned with the threat of lawsuits. 72 Quasi-private
prison guards would not be indemnified by the private enterprise's
insurance carrier, yet they need not be fearful of potential lawsuits
under section 1983 because they will know that they have a
qualified immunity defense to any potential lawsuits.
Competitive market pressures, another factor the Richardson
Court cites as a reason not to extend qualified immunity to private
prison guards, would also not apply in the quasi-private setting,
because the quasi-guard will be functioning strictly as a federal
employee, and will not be able to laterally move to a prison
functioning on a wholly private basis.'7 3
The Richardson Court's analysis of the functional approach to
determining whether a private prison guard is entitled to a qualified
immunity defense sidesteps the issue by offering the explanation
that there are many identical areas in which government and
private industry participate. 7 4 While this is quite true, most of these
areas do not involve frivolous lawsuits by prisoners with ample
time on their hands, which serve to saturate the legal system and
result in a loss of valuable time and money. Prison guards are sued
quite regularly. 75 This is due to both the nature of the environment
and the duties that the job entails. Governmental prison guards are
afforded qualified immunity to guard against an unnecessary waste
of government time and government money. Governmental prison
guards and private prison guards perform the same exact duties.
There is no justifiable reason why one should be afforded qualified
immunity over the other.
David J. DelFiandra

172. Id. at 410-11.
173. Id. at 409. The Court stated, "Competitive pressures mean not only that a firm
whose guards are too aggressive will face damages that raise costs, thereby threatening its
replacement, but also that a firm whose guards are too timid will face threats of replacement
by other firms with records that demonstrate their ability to do a safer and a more effective
job." Id.
174. Id.
175. Tom Zoelner, Prisoners Get Nowhere with Most Lawsuits, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,
November 7, 1997. By 1996, there were 68,235 lawsuits filed by the incarcerated U.S.
population. Id.

